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Abstract:  
The paper deals with poverty orderings when multidimensional attributes exhibit some 
degree of comparability. The paper focuses on an important special case of this, that is, 
comparisons of poverty that make use of incomes at different time periods. The ordering 
criteria extend the power of earlier multidimensional dominance tests by making 
(reasonable) assumptions on the relative marginal contributions of each temporal 
dimension to poverty. Inter alia, this involves drawing on natural symmetry and 
asymmetry assumptions as well as on the mean/variability framework commonly used in 
the risk literature. The resulting procedures make it possible to check for the robustness 
of poverty comparisons to choices of temporal aggregation procedures and to areas of 
intertemporal poverty frontiers. The results are illustrated using a rich sample of 23 
European countries over 2006-09. 
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the problem of making general comparisons of well-being when well-
being is measured in multiple dimensions. We note at the outset that much of the literature
on the measurement of well-being incorporates multiple dimensional indicators by adding
them up, such as when food and non-food expenditures are aggregated to compute total ex-
penditures and assess monetary poverty — essentially returning to a univariate analysis. In
some cases, these procedures may be perfectly appropriate. In other cases, however, it could
be that the specific aggregation rules used to sum up the dimensions may be deemed some-
what arbitrary or objectionable, especially when the dimensions cannot be considered evi-
dently comparable or perfectly substitutable in generating overall well-being. This then leaves
open the possibility that two equally admissible rules for aggregating across several dimen-
sions of well-being could lead to contradictory rankings of well-being and/or conclusions for
policy guidance.
One way to address this problem is through the use of multidimensional dominance pro-
cedures, as found in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Bourguignon (1989), or Duclos, Sahn
and Younger (2006). These are indeed useful procedures that make relatively few assump-
tions on the structure of the framework used to measure and compare well-being. Their first-
order multidimensional dominance comparisons suppose, for instance, that overall well-being
should increase with dimensional well-being, but that the importance of these increases cannot
be ranked across dimensions. Such comparisons do not impose any assumption of cardinality
on the dimensional indicators of well-being. Because of this, they can generate rather robust
multidimensional comparisons of well-being from a normative point of view.
These weak assumptions come, however, at the cost of a limited power to order distribu-
tions ofmultidimensional well-being. It would seem that they could be strengthened in several
settings. One such setting is when the dimensional indicators have values that are comparable.
Examples include the measurement of household poverty, using the incomes of the members
of the same household as dimensions, but without assuming perfect income pooling; the mea-
surement of child well-being, using the health or the nutritional status of children of the same
household as dimensions, but without assuming that there is perfect substitutability of such
status across the children; or the measurement of household education, using the education
of members of the same household as dimensions, but again without assuming that for mea-
surement purposes we can impose perfect substitutability of educational achievements across
members of the same household.
We build in this paper on the natural cardinality of multi-period incomes, which makes
it possible to compare them in more specific ways than has been done until now. Thus, al-
though themethodswe develop have broader applicability, the paper focuses on intertemporal
poverty comparisons, that is comparisons of poverty over different time periods.1
In contrast to some of the earlier work,2 the paper’s objective is to develop procedures
1 Though intertemporal poverty is the most widely used name for that concept, it is sometimes also called
“longitudinal poverty” (Busetta, Mendola andMilito, 2011, Busetta and Mendola, 2012) or “lifetime poverty” (Hoy,
Thompson and Zheng, 2012) in the literature.
2 See for instance Foster (2007), Calvo and Dercon (2009), Hoy et al. (2012), Duclos, Araar and Giles (2010), and
Bossert, Chakravarty and d’Ambrosio (2011), but analogously to Hoy and Zheng (2008), though within a rather
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for checking for whether intertemporal poverty comparisons are robust to aggregation pro-
cedures and to choices of multi-period poverty frontiers. Intertemporal poverty comparisons
can thereby be made “poverty-measure robust,” namely, valid for broad classes of aggregation
rules across individuals and also for broad classes of aggregation rules across time. The com-
parisons can thereby also be made “poverty-line robust,” in the sense of being valid for any
temporal poverty frontier over broad areas of poverty frontiers. Given the difficulty involved
in choosing poverty frontiers and poverty indices, and given the frequent sensitivity of poverty
comparisons to these choices, this would appear to be a potentially useful contribution.
One of the first conceptual challenges in analyzing temporal poverty is deciding who is
“time poor.” Measuring well-being across two time periods, say, a person can be considered
intertemporally poor if her income falls below an income poverty line in both periods or in
either period. This can be defined respectively as intersection and union definitions of temporal
poverty. The procedures that we develop are valid for both definitions— and also valid for any
choice of intermediate definitions for which the poverty line at one time period is a function of
well-being at the other.
The paper also considers the role of mobility in the measurement of intertemporal poverty,
both across time and across individuals. With the increased availability of longitudinal data
sets, it is now well known that there are often significant movements in and out of poverty,
as well as within poverty itself. Such income mobility has at least two welfare impacts.3 The
first is to make the distribution of “permanent” incomes across individuals more equal than
the distribution of temporal incomes. Measures of poverty that are averse to inequality across
individuals will therefore tend to be lower when based on permanent incomes. Mobility also
introduces temporal variability. If individuals would prefer their incomes to be distributed as
equally as possible across time (because they are risk averse or because they have limited access
to credit and hence cannot smooth their consumption), then incomemobility will also decrease
well-being and thus increase poverty. The framework developed below will implicitly take
into account that possible trade-off between the benefit of across-individual mobility and the
cost of across-time variability.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. The next section elaborates
on Duclos et al.’s (2006) multidimensional dominance criteria so as to extend the power of
their procedures without making the usual higher-order dominance assumptions. Increases
in the power of dominance tests are traditionally obtained by emphasizing the importance of
attribute-specific inequality across individuals. Section 2 uses instead across-attribute sym-
metry and asymmetry properties and introduces assumptions on how permutations of multi-
period income profiles should affect poverty.
Since it is often supposed that individuals prefer smoothed income patterns, Section 3 also
explicitly takes into account intertemporal inequalities. This is done by drawing, in a flexible
measurement setting, on the popular mean/variability framework that is used in the risk lit-
erature to measure the cost of risk and assess behavior under such risk. The links between the
different — time-additive — framework.
3 See, in the recent literature, Atkinson, Cantillon, Marlier and Nolan (2002), Chaudhuri, Jalan and Suryahadi
(2002), Ligon and Schechter (2003), Cruces and Wodon (2003), Bourguignon, Goh and Kim (2004), Christiaensen
and Subbarao (2004), and Kamanou and Morduch (2004).
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classes of poverty indices described in Section 2 and 3 are highlighted in Section 4.
The results are illustrated in Section 5 using a rich set of data on 23 European countries
drawn from the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions. The results indi-
cate that about 63% of the 253 possible pairs of European countries can be ordered using an
assumption of normative neutrality towards intertemporal income variability (that is perfect
pooling of incomes at the individual level). An assumption of no aversion to intertemporal
income variability is, however, a strong assumption. Relaxing it and allowing for temporal
variability to matter in a flexible measurement framework reduces the proportion of ranked
pairs to 46%.
Strengthening the measurement framework by imposing early poverty and/or loss aver-
sion sensitivity increases the ordering power to around 50% of the pairwise comparisons.
Adding temporal symmetry (which says that the cost of early poverty is no more or no less
important than the cost of loss aversion) further increases the number of orderings to 55% of
the total number of pairs. This is not far from the 63% power obtained in the initial context
in which income variability is ignored, suggesting that the empirical ordering cost of using
a flexible poverty measurement framework may not be large. It is also not far from the 62%
percentage of pairwise comparisons that can be ordered using general second-order multidi-
mensional dominance tests. These second-order dominance tests require, however, cardinality
of the different attributes used to measure welfare, a requirement that is not needed for first-
order symmetric/asymmetric dominance tests.
Section 5 also reports that the popular mean/variability framework for thinking about in-
tertemporal welfare does not have empirical strength with our data. This suggests that this
framework may not be as empirically useful for making intertemporal welfare comparisons as
some of the methods recently proposed in the multidimensional poverty literature. Section 6
concludes.
2 Intertemporal poverty
Let overall well-being be a function of two indicators, x1 and x2 , and be given by λx1, x2.4
This function is a member of Λ, defined as the set of continuous and non-decreasing functions
of x1 and x2. For our purposes, we will typically think of xt as income at time t; the vector
x1, x2 is called an income profile. For instance, x1 may denote an individual’s income during
his working life, while x2 could be his income when retired. Without loss of generality, we
assume that incomes are defined on the set of positive real numbers, so that λ R2

 R.
Similarly to Duclos et al. (2006), we assume that an unknown poverty frontier separates
the poor from the rich. We can think of this frontier as a set of points at which the well-
being of an individual is precisely equal to a “poverty level” of well-being, and below which
individuals are in poverty. This frontier is assumed to be defined implicitly by a locus of the
form λx1, x2   0, and is analogous to the usual downward-sloping indifference curves in the
x1, x2 space. Intertemporal poverty is then defined by states in which λx1, x2 B 0, and the
4For expositional simplicity, we focus on the case of two dimensions of individual well-being. Extensions to
cases with more than two dimensions are discussed in footnotes.
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poverty domain is consequently obtained as:
Γλ   x1, x2 > R2

Sλx1, x2 B 0 . (1)
Let the joint cumulative distribution function of x1 and x2 be denoted by Fx1, x2. For
analytical simplicity, we focus on classes of additive bidimensional poverty indices, which are
the kernels of broader classes of subgroup-consistent bidimensional poverty indices.5 Such
bidimensional indices can be defined generally as Pλ:
Pλ  
U
Γλ
pix1, x2;λ dFx1 , x2, (2)
where pix1, x2;λ is the contribution to overall poverty of an individual whose income at
period 1 and 2 is respectively x1 and x2. The well-known “focus axiom” entails that:
pix1, x2;λ
¢
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¤
C 0 if x1, x2 > Γλ,
  0 otherwise.
(3)
This says that someone contributes to poverty only if his income profile is in the poverty do-
main.
Our definitions of both the poverty domain and the poverty indices are consistent with
different types of aggregation procedures. In a recent paper, Ravallion (2011) contrasted two
different approaches to aggregation at the individual level, that is, the “attainment aggrega-
tion” and the “deprivation aggregation” approaches. With the first approach, the values of
the different attributes are blended together into a single well-being value,6 the resulting value
then being compared to some poverty threshold. In the context of intertemporal poverty, that
approach is used for instance by Rodgers and Rodgers (1993) and Jalan and Ravallion (1998)
for themeasurement of chronic poverty. With the second “deprivation aggregation” approach,
the extent of deprivations in each dimension is first assessed and those deprivation means are
then aggregated into a composite index. This is exemplified by Foster (2007), Hoy and Zheng
(2008), Duclos et al. (2010) and Bossert et al. (2011). The first approach generally allows de-
privations in some dimension to be compensated by “surpluses” in some other dimension;
compensation effects are generally not allowed with the “deprivation aggregation” approach.
The respective merits of each approach are discussed notably in Ravallion (2011) and Alkire
and Foster (2011b). This paper’s framework encompasses both approaches.
For ease of exposition, let the derivatives of pi in (3) be defined as:
• piia, b, i   1, 2, for the first-order derivative of pi with respect to its ith argument,
• and as piaa, b, for the first-order derivative of pi with respect to the variable a, so that
piuau, bu   pi1au, bu ∂a∂u pi
2
au, bu ∂b∂u .
5For the unidimensional case, see Foster and Shorrocks (1991).
6 Ravallion (2011) only deals with the case of linear aggregation using a fixed set of prices, but the use of well-
being functions like λ could also be considered.
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Figure 1: An increase in temporal correlation cannot decrease temporal poverty
Then, define the class Π¨λ of poverty indices Pλ as:
Π¨λ  
¢
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¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¤
Pλ
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Γλ ` Γλ,
pix1, x2;λ   0, whenever λx1, x2   0,
pi1x1, x2;λ B 0 and pi2x1, x2;λ B 0 x1, x2,
pi1,2x1, x2;λ C 0,x1, x2.
£
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
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¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¥
(4)
The class Π¨λ includes inter alia the families of bidimensional poverty indices proposed
by Chakravarty, Mukherjee and Ranade (1998), Tsui (2002), and Chakravarty, Deutsch and
Silber (2008), as well as some members of the family of indices introduced by Bourguignon
and Chakravarty (2003). The first condition in (4) indicates that the poverty domain Γλ for
each Pλ should lie within the domain defined by λ (λ then representing the maximum
admissible poverty frontier). The second condition in (4) says that the poverty measures are
continuous along the poverty frontier. Continuity is often assumed in order to prevent small
measurement errors from resulting in non-marginal variations of the poverty index.7 The third
condition in (4) is a monotonicity condition, i.e., a condition that says that an income increment
in any period should never increase poverty.8
The fourth and last condition in (4) says that poverty should not decrease after a “correla-
tion increasing switch”, an axiom introduced by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). It is thus
7 This continuity assumption therefore precludes most members of the Alkire and Foster (2011a) family of
poverty indices from being part of Π¨λ.
8As noted in Duclos et al. (2006), we must also have that pi1  0, pi2  0, and pi1,2 A 0 over some ranges of
x1 and x2 for the indices to be non-degenerate.
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supposed that the poverty benefit of an income increment at period 1 (2) decreases with the
income level at period 2 (1). Intuitively, this also says that a permutation of the incomes of
two poor individuals during a given period should not decrease poverty if one of them then
becomes more deprived than the other in both periods. This can be seen on Figure 1, where
it is supposed that profile I moves to profile I, and profile J moves to profile J. This permu-
tation does not change the distribution of incomes at each time period, but it does increase
the temporal correlation of incomes across individuals. The axiom of “non-decreasing poverty
after a correlation increasing switch” says that poverty should not fall after this permutation.
Note that this axiom implies that incomes at time 1 and 2 are substitutes in producing overall
well-being, which would seem to be a natural assumption.
A bidimensional stochastic dominance surface can now be defined using:
Pα,βzu, zv  
S
zu
0
S
zv
0
zu  u
α1
zv  v
β1 dFu, v, (5)
where α and β refer to the dominance order in each dimension. The present paper focusses
on first-order dominance, so that α and β are set equal to 1. The function P1,1zu, zv is the
intersection bidimensional poverty headcount index: it is the population of individuals whose
temporal incomes at time 1 and 2 are below zu and zv, respectively.
Duclos et al. (2006) then show:
Proposition 1. (Duclos et al., 2006)
PAλ C PBλ, Pλ > Π¨λ

, (6)
iff P1,1A x1, x2 C P
1,1
B x1, x2, x1, x2 > Γλ

. (7)
Proposition 1 says that poverty is unambiguously larger for population A than for popu-
lation B for all poverty sets within Γλ and for all members of the class of bidimensional
poverty measures Π¨λ if and only if the bidimensional poverty headcount P1,1 is greater in
A than in B for all intersection poverty frontiers in Γλ. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which
shows both the position of the upper poverty frontier λ and some of the rectangular areas
over which P1,1A and P
1,1
B must be computed. If P
1,1
A x1, x2 is larger than P
1,1
B x1, x2 for all of
the rectangles that fit within Γλ, then (6) is obtained.
In the next pages, the power of the dominance criterion found in Proposition 1 is increased
by adding assumptions on the poverty effects of income changes at each time period. For
this, it is useful to distinguish between profiles with a lower first-period income and profiles
with a lower second-period income. The poverty domain can be split into Γ1λ   x1, x2 >
ΓλSx1  x2, the set of poverty profiles whose minimal income is found in the first period,
and Γ2λ   x1, x2 > ΓλSx1 C x2, the set of poverty profiles whose minimal income is
found in the second period. Equation (2) can then be written as:
Pλ  
U
Γ1λ
pix1, x2;λ dFx1 , x2 
U
Γ2λ
pix1, x2;λ dFx1 , x2, (8)
that is, the sum of relatively low-x1 poverty and of relatively low-x2 poverty. It is worth noting
that the use of equation (8) makes sense only if incomes can be compared. Cost of living
7
λx1, x2   0
Γλ
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Figure 2: Bidimensional poverty dominance.
differences between the two periods and/or discounting preferences of the social evaluator
may thus have to be taken into account before proceeding to (8) and to the symmetry and
asymmetry properties that we are about to introduce. It is worth stressing that the need to
compare ordinally the different values of x1 and x2 does not require that they be cardinal. An
instance of non-cardinality but comparability is when x1 and x2 represent the health status of
an individual at two points in time, where we would need to ensure that a value a at the first
period is comparable to a value a at the second period.
2.1 Symmetry
We now impose symmetry in the treatment of incomes, so that switching the values of the
intertemporal income profile of any individual does not change poverty. This is a rather strong
assumption since it means that the social evaluator is indifferent to the period at which incomes
are enjoyed (again, after possibly adjusting for price differences and discounting preferences).
Symmetry may, however, be regarded as reasonable for intertemporal poverty comparisons
when the analysis focuses on a relatively short-time span. It may also be appropriate when one
wishes to relax the assumption of perfect substitutability of temporal incomes (made when a
univariate analysis focuses on the sum of periodic incomes) without imposing asymmetry in
the treatment of incomes.
The symmetry assumption implies that the poverty frontier is symmetric with respect to
the line of perfect temporal income equality. As a consequence, the poverty domain is de-
fined with respect to the functions λS that are symmetric at the poverty frontier: λSx1, x2  
8
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Figure 3: A poverty domain with symmetry
λSx2, x1 x1, x2, such that λSx1, x2   0. Figure 3 illustrates this in the case of two in-
come profiles, I   a, b and J   b, a, both on the poverty frontier. The poverty frontier that
links I and J is symmetric along the 45-degree line, the line of temporal income equality; so
is the straight line that is perpendicular to that same 45-degree line. That straight line is a
special case of all of the symmetric poverty frontiers; it is a poverty frontier that assumes per-
fect substitutability of temporal incomes. As we will discuss later, the use of those symmetric
and straight poverty frontiers is equivalent to measuring temporal poverty using the sum of
temporal incomes.
Let ΛS be the subset of Λ whose members are symmetric, and consider the class Π¨S of
symmetric poverty measures defined as:
Π¨Sλ

S   PλS > Π¨λ

S Tpix1, x2;λS   pix2, x1;λS,x1, x2 > ΓλS . (9)
A restriction imposed by (9) is that the marginal effect of an income increment in the first
period equals the marginal effect of the same increment in the second period, for two sym-
metric income profiles (pi1x1, x2;λS   pi2x2, x1;λS, x1, x2 > ΓλS). Similarly, (9) also
says that the variation of the marginal contribution of an income increment is symmetric for
symmetric income profiles (pi1,2x1, x2;λS   pi1,2x2, x1;λS, x1, x2 > ΓλS).
Proposition 2 shows how robust comparisons of bidimensional poverty can be made with
symmetry.
Proposition 2.
PAλS A PBλS, PλS > Π¨Sλ

S, (10)
9
90X
45X
x1u z
 v
x2
u
z
v
Figure 4: Symmetric property dominance
iff P1,1A x1, x2 P
1,1
A x2, x1 A P
1,1
B x1, x2 P
1,1
B x2, x1, x1, x2 > Γλ

S. (11)
Proof. See appendix A.
Proposition 2 says that poverty dominance can be checked by adding up two intersection
headcounts, the first at a poverty line x1, x2 and the second at x2, x1.9 With symmetric
intertemporal poverty indices, we must therefore compare the sum of two intersection in-
tertemporal headcounts that have symmetric poverty lines. Figure 4 shows graphically what
this means: we must sum the proportions of income profiles found within two symmetric rect-
angular areas, each of them capturing the importance of those with low incomes in one time
period. This effectively double counts the number of individuals that are highly deprived in
both periods, as the double-slashed rectangle in Figure 4 shows.10
Define z as the minimal permanent income value an individual should enjoy at each pe-
riod in order to escape poverty, that is, λSz, z   0. Chronic poverty is often defined in the
9 Extending Proposition 2 to cases with more than two dimensions is relatively straightforward. For instance,
if symmetry is assumed with three dimensions, one has to compare the sum of the joint distributions for the six
permutations of each possible set of temporal poverty lines, that is Fu, v,w Fu,w, v Fv, u,w Fv,w, u
Fw, u, v Fw, v, u.
10In the tridimensional case mentioned in footnote 9, multiple counting also occurs but in a more complex man-
ner. Those individuals whose incomes are less than z at each period are counted six times when checking domi-
nance. Double counting occurs for those poor individuals whose incomes are below z during only two periods of
time. The multidimensional dominance criterion thus introduces weights on poor households that depend on the
number of periods of deprivations that they experience. Because of this, the social benefit of decreasing individual
deprivation increases with the number of income shortfalls (with respect to z): a two-period-deprived person is
twice as important as a single-period-deprived person, and a three-period-deprived person is thrice as important
as a two-period-deprived person.
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literature (see for instance the “always poor” in Hulme and Shepherd, 2003) as income being
below z in both periods. The transient poor are those that are below the poverty frontier but
that are not chronically poor. The double counting of Proposition 2 can be seen to weight the
chronic poor twice as much as the transient ones.
The power of Proposition 2 to order two distributions is larger than that of Proposition 1.
This is because (11) gives greater importance to “more severe” intertemporal poverty, namely,
poverty in both periods. To see this, consider two income distributions, A and B, made of
profiles 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, 4 and 1, 2, 4, 3, 4, 3 respectively. Using Proposition 1, one
would not be able to order these two distributions since equation (7) is larger for A when
evaluated at 2, 1 and larger for B when evaluated at 1, 2. We would, however, observe
dominance using Proposition 2 since equation (11) at 1, 2 would now be larger for A. This
is because the symmetry assumption makes it possible to compare 1, 2 with 2, 1, and that
distribution A can thus be declared to have more severe poverty.
2.2 Asymmetry
Symmetry may not be appropriate, however, in those cases in which we may not be (individu-
ally or socially) indifferent to a permutation of periodic incomes. We may yet feel that poverty
is higher with income profile x1, x2 thanwith x2, x1whenever x1  x2. For instance, wemay
think that low income is more detrimental to well-being during childhood than during adult-
hood, perhaps because low income as a child can lead to poorer health and lower educational
outcomes over the entire lifetime.
Asymmetry can also be reasonable when there is uncertainty regarding the appropriate
scaling up of incomes in a given period before applying symmetry. This may be the case when
intertemporal price adjustments need to be made but when true inflation is unknown. If the
purchasing power of money has decreased, but the extent of that fall is not known for sure, a
prudent proceduremay be to impose asymmetry on the treatment of the components of the in-
come profiles. Asymmetry is also the general case in the class of intertemporal poverty indices
proposed by Hoy and Zheng (2008) and Calvo and Dercon (2009), where periodic weights
decrease as the final period is approached.
Without loss of generality, assume that income profileswithin Γ1λ never yield less poverty
than their symmetric image in Γ2λ. The well-being functions λAS that are consistent with
asymmetry are then members of the set ΛAS of well-being functions defined by:
ΛAS   λ > ΛSλx1, x2 B λx2, x1   0, x1 B x2. (12)
Figure 5 illustrates the possible shape of these functions. The asymmetry of λASx1, x2 in-
dicates that low x1 is a source of greater poverty than low x2. The poverty frontier (λASx1, x2  
0, the continuous line) is chosen such that the poverty domain Γ1λAS (the shaded area with
vertical lines) is larger than Γ2λAS (the shaded area with horizontal lines). In particular, the
symmetric set of Γ2λAS with respect to the line of perfect equality is a subset of Γ1λAS.
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Figure 5: Asymmetric poverty measurement
We can then consider the following class of asymmetric poverty measures:
Π¨ASλ

AS  
¢
¨
¨

¨
¨
¤
Pλ > Π¨λAS
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
pi1x1, x2;λ B pi2x2, x1;λ if x1 B x2
pi1,2x1, x2;λ C pi1,2x2, x1;λ if x1 B x2.
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¨
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(13)
The first line to the right of (13) implies that changes in the lowest income have a greater
impact on poverty when the lowest income is in the first period. Consequently, for equal
values of x1 and x2, changes in x1 have a greater impact on welfare than changes in x2. The
second line states that the poverty benefit of an increase in either x1 or x2 decreases the most
with the value of the other variable when the income profile is the one with the lowest first
period income. It also says that a correlation decreasing switch decreases poverty more when
x1 is lower, for the same total income. Both lines emphasize the greater normative importance
of those with lower first-period incomes.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for robustly ordering asymmetric poverty mea-
sures are presented in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3.
PAλAS A PBλAS, PλAS > Π¨ASλ

AS, (14)
iff P1,1A x1, x2 A P
1,1
B x1, x2, x1, x2 > Γ1λ

AS (15)
and P1,1A x1, x2  P
1,1
A x2, x1 A P
1,1
B x1, x2 P
1,1
B x2, x1, x1, x2 > Γ2λ

AS. (16)
Proof. See appendix A.
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Figure 6: Asymmetric poverty dominance
The first condition in Proposition (3) says that dominance should first hold for each point
in Γ1λAS. That condition is illustrated in Figure 6. For any a, b with a  b, asymmetric
poverty dominance implies that the share of the populationwhose incomes are simultaneously
less than a and b respectively at period 1 and 2 (those in the rectangle with slanting lines on
Figure 6) should be lower in B than in A. Thus, contrary to symmetric dominance, poverty
cannot be lower in B if the intersection headcount with a relatively low first-period threshold
is higher in B. Condition (16) is the same as condition (11) in Proposition 2, but for income
profiles within Γ2λAS. Since symmetric poverty indices can be regarded as limiting cases of
asymmetric ones, dominance with asymmetry logically implies dominance with symmetry, so
long as the set of symmetric poverty frontiers lie within the set of asymmetric ones.
The power of Proposition 3 is larger than that of Proposition 1. To illustrate the difference
in ranking power, consider two income distributions, A and B, with distribution A made of
profiles 1, 2, 1, 2 and distribution B made of profiles 2, 1, 6, 6, and with z=5. Using
Proposition 1, onewould not be able to order these two distributions since equation (7) is larger
for A when evaluated at 1, 2 and larger for B when evaluated at 2, 1; indeed, although A
may look poorer than B at first glance, one of the profiles in B has the lowest income at time 2.
We would, however, observe asymmetric dominance since equation (15) at 2, 1 is larger for
A.
Note, however, that with the example (used on page 11) of distributions A set to 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, 4
and B set to 1, 2, 4, 3, 4, 3 no asymmetric poverty ordering holds. The stronger symme-
try assumptions of Proposition 2 are needed to rank these two distributions.
The conditions in Proposition 3 may thus hold even if B has a larger proportion of poor
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Figure 7: Ranking income profiles with aversion to intertemporal inequalities
with low x2, so long as this is compensated by a lower proportion with low x1. This is reminis-
cent of the sequential stochastic dominance conditions found in Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987) and Atkinson (1992) and in subsequent work. Although apparently similar, the two
frameworks and their respective orderings conditions are different. The literature on sequen-
tial dominance makes assumptions only on the signs of different orders of derivatives; the
conditions in (13) compare the value of these derivatives across dimensions, a procedure that is
possible only when the dimensions are comparable (and a procedure that has not been sug-
gested or developed to our knowledge). Such comparability assumptions are not made in the
sequential dominance literature since the dimensions involved (income and family size, for
instance) typically do not have comparable measurement units.
3 Aversion to intertemporal variability
Consider the income profiles I   a, b and J   u, v drawn in Figure 7. By projecting these
two profiles on the diagonal of perfect temporal equality, it can be seen that both profiles are
characterized by the same total temporal income, so that the only difference between them
is the way total income is allocated across the two periods. We may feel that individuals
are better off when the distribution of a given total amount is smoothed across periods; we
should then infer that poverty is unambiguously lower with income profile I than with J (since
Sa  bS  Su  vS). This, however, cannot be inferred with any of the previous propositions.
We can also compare two income profiles that differ in their total (or mean) income. For
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instance, let us assume that an income profile J sees an increase in its first-period income.
Let the new income profile be J   u, v, as in Figure 7. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 would
declare that movement to decrease poverty. Both intertemporal variability and average income
have increased. A mean/variability evaluation framework does not therefore necessarily find
that intertemporal poverty has fallen. To compare J and J, we could think of a lexicographic
assumption that either mean income or distance from themean prevails on the other. We could
also use results from the social welfare literature when both inequality andmean income differ.
In that regard and as noted by Kolm (1976) in a unidimensional context, views differ as
to how additional income should be shared among different people so as to leave inequality
unchanged. The relative view is that sharing this additional income according to the initial
income shares of individuals would preserve the initial level of inequality; the absolute view is
that inequality is maintained if the same absolute amount of income is distributed to everyone.
With this in mind, let us define poverty with respect to average income and income devia-
tions from that average. An income profile x1, x2 is then described by the coordinates µ, τ,
with µ being mean income and τ some measure of the distance of the lowest income to the
mean. One reasonable property to impose on τ is unit-consistency; this states that changing
the income measurement scale (using euros instead of cents, for instance) should not change
the ranking properties of the measure (Zheng, 2007). Within our setting, unit consistency de-
mands that multiplying each income profile element by the same scalar should not change the
intertemporal inequality ranking of the income profiles.
We can then make use of a particular definition of τ, that is τη  
minx1 ,x2µ
µη , η >  0, 1,
(Krtscha, 1994, Zoli, 2003, Yoshida, 2005), so that τ1  
minx1 ,x2
µ  1 for a relative inequality
aversion view and τ0  minx1, x2  µ for an absolute inequality aversion view.11 For a given
µ, τ ranges from µ1η B 0 (extreme inequality) to 0 (perfect equality). Poverty is reasonably
assumed to decrease with both µ and τη (which we term “variability”, as a shorthand for
temporal inequality).
Figure 8 illustrates the influence of η on the orderings of an income profile I with profiles
with a lower mean income and located on the same side of the diagonal of equality. The areas
below I with horizontal, slanting and vertical hatches correspond to the set of income profiles
with unambiguously higher poverty than I when η is respectively set to 1, 0.5, and 0.12 The
areas above I but inside Γ2λ are those poor income profiles that are better than I for all values
of η. Whatever the location of I, the relative view ranks more income profiles as worse than
the intermediate and absolute views. For instance, income profiles J, J, and J exhibit the
same distance τη as I with respect to the first diagonal when η is respectively set equal to 1,
0.5, and 0, but average income is lower. I is preferred to J, J, and J for η   1, but cannot be
ranked with J and J when η  0.5. Relative views also increase the set of income profiles that
are preferred to I. In that sense, absolute views rely on the weakest measurement assumptions
11 See Zheng (2007) for more on this.
12 While the cases of η equal to 1 and 0 can easily be understood, intermediate cases are more difficult. For
instance, with η   0.5, inequality will be preservedwhen moving from µ1 to µ2 if each additional euro is distributed
in the following manner between the two periods: fifty cents are distributed proportionally to the shares of each
period in total income and the remaining fifty cents are equally shared; then fifty cents are allocated according to
the new income shares and the remaining fifty cents are equally distributed, and so on until the individual’s mean
income is µ2.
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Figure 8: Bidimensional poverty with relative, intermediate and absolute variability
aversion views.
and also induce the weakest power for ranking income profiles.
We can also express the poverty frontier as a function of both µ and τη . Let λ˜ be defined as:
λ˜µ, τη , j  
¢
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¤
λ˜µ, τη , 1 if x1  x2,
λ˜µ, τη , 2 otherwise.
(17)
Recall that both µ and τη are functions of x1 and x2. We can also assume that λ˜µ, τη , j  
λx1, x2, namely, that each function λ˜ has a unique representation λ in the space x1, x2, and
that ∂λ˜∂µ A 0 and
∂λ˜
∂τη
A 0. Let Λ˜ be the set of mean-income increasing and variability-decreasing
well-being functions. It is worth indicating that non-increasingness with respect to variability
entails both that the poverty frontier is convex and that it is never below the straight line
through z, z that is orthogonal to the line of perfect equality.13 For convenience, we can
express the poverty domain in the space x1, x2 as:
Γλ˜   x1, x2 >R2

T λ˜µ, τη , j B 0 , (18)
where, as previously, Γλ˜ can be divided into Γ1λ˜ and Γ2λ˜ to distinguish relatively low-x1
income profiles from relatively low-x2 income profiles.
13 Were these conditions not met, it would be possible for some income profiles to leave the poverty domain by
an increase in intertemporal variability.
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3.1 The general case
To use the above setting for intertemporal poverty ranking, let q   probx1  x2 be the share
of the population whose first-period income is lower than second-period income. Let ρ1 (ρ2)
be the individual poverty measure when x1  x2 (x1 C x2), and let F1 (F2) denote the joint
cumulative distribution function of µ and τη conditional on x1  x2 (x1 C x2). A variability-
averse poverty measure is given by
P˜λ˜   q
U
Γ1λ˜
ρ1µ, τη ; λ˜ dF1µ, τη 1  q
U
Γ2λ˜;λ˜
ρ2µ, τη dF2µ, τη. (19)
As in Section 2, equation (19) corresponds to a general definition of additive intertemporal
poverty measures, i.e., overall poverty is simply the average individual poverty level.14 Let
the class Π˜ηλ˜ of mean/variability poverty indices be defined as:
Π˜ηλ˜

  
¢
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¤
Pλ˜
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Γλ˜ ` Γλ˜
ρtµ, τη ; λ˜   0, whenever λ˜µ, τη   0 t
ρ1µ, 0, λ˜   ρ2µ, 0, λ˜µ
ρ
1
t µ, τη ; λ˜ B 0 and ρ
2
t µ, τη ; λ˜ B 0 µ, τη , t
ρ
1,2
t µ, τη ; λ˜ C 0,µ, τη ,t.
£
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
§
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¥
(20)
As in the case of the class Π¨λ defined in equation (4), the first two conditions say that
the chosen poverty frontier should be nowhere above the maximum admissible poverty fron-
tier λ˜, and that ρt is continuous at the poverty frontier. The third condition says that poverty
measurement is continuous at the diagonal of perfect temporal equality. The fourth condi-
tion states that intertemporal variability-preserving income increments and mean-preserving
variability-increasing transfers should not increase poverty.
The last condition in (20) says that the greater the variability of income profiles, themore ef-
fective are variability-preserving income increments in reducing poverty. Similarly, the benefit
of a mean-preserving variability-decreasing income change falls with mean income. This con-
dition can also be interpreted in terms of correlation-increasing switches in the µ, τη space:
permuting the values of either µ or τη of two poor individuals, so that one of them becomes
unambiguously poorer that the other, cannot reduce poverty. Figure 9 illustrates this in the
case of relative variability aversion. The permutation of τ1 that moves I and J to I and J,
respectively, necessarily improves the situation of individual I what worsens that of J (who is
then poorer than I). The permutation does not affect the marginal distributions of µ and τ1,
14 Although not as straightforward as with the poverty indices of Section 2, extending this mean/variability
framework to T A 2 periods can be done. Let µk be the average value of the k   1, . . . T lowest values of an income
profile. µ1 is thus the minimal value of the income profile and µT   µ is average income. Then, define τk,η  
µkµ
µη ,
with τk,η >  µ
1η , 0. It can be seen that for each income profile of size T, only T  1 observations of inequality
are needed to describe all relevant intertemporal inequalities. So an income profile x1 , x2 . . . , xT can be fully
described in terms of intertemporal inequalities and average income by the T-vector τ1,η , τ2,η . . . , τT1,η , µ.
If income timing matters for poverty assessment (as for asymmetric poverty indices), this vector will not be
sufficient. For instance, in the three-period case, it would be necessary to make use of 3!   6 possibly different
individual poverty indices ρs,t, where s indicates the period of the lowest income and t is the period for the second-
lowest income. Once this is done, generalizing Propositions 4 to 7 is relatively straightforward.
17
45X
bI
bI

b
J
b
J
λx1, x2   0
x1
x2
Figure 9: A correlation-increasing switch in the space µ, τ1 (relative variability aversion).
but nevertheless results in an increased correlation between them. The two different forms of
deprivation then cumulating over the same person, it seems natural to regard such a change
as worsening overall poverty.
This leads to the following general result.
Proposition 4.
PAλ˜ A PBλ˜, Pλ˜ > Π˜ηλ˜

, (21)
iff qAP
1,1
A µ, τη Sx1  x2 A qBP
1,1
B µ, τη Sx1  x2, µ, τη > Γ1λ˜

, (22)
and 1  qAP
1,1
A µ, τη Sx1 C x2 A 1 qBP
1,1
B µ, τη Sx1 C x2, µ, τη > Γ2λ˜

. (23)
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 4 says that distribution A exhibits more poverty than distribution B over the
class of mean/variability poverty indices if and only if the share of the population with low
mean income and high variability is greater in A than in B, whatever µ, τηwithin the poverty
domain is used and considering separately each low-x1 and low-x2 region. Figure 10 illustrates
the dominance criteria in the case of absolute variability aversion. Each income profile in Γλ˜
defines a rectangular triangle whose hypotenuse is either the x1 or the x2-axis, for x1 A x2 and
x1  x2 respectively. Poverty is larger for the distribution that shows a larger population share
within each one of those triangular areas that fit within Γλ˜. It can be seen by inspection
that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for dominance of B over A is that the marginal
distribution of µ for A is nowhere below that for B at each value of µ below z.
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Figure 10: Poverty dominance criteria with absolute variability aversion.
It is useful to compare the ability of Propositions 1 and 4 to rank distributions. Suppose
that distributions A and B are respectively defined by the income profiles 3, 1, 1, 5 and
3, 1, 3, 4. These two distributions cannot be ordered by Proposition 1 if all profiles lie
within the poverty domain Γλ: the intersection headcount is larger for B when evaluated
at 3, 4, but lower when evaluated at 1, 5. In the space µ, τ0, the ordinates of the two
distributions become 2,1, 3,2 and 2,1, 3.5,0.5. It can then be seen that the
joint distribution function of µ, τ0 is larger for A when evaluated at 3,2 and nowhere
lower when evaluated at any other point of the poverty domain. Consequently, A exhibits
more poverty than B by Proposition 4.
This does not mean that the overall ordering power of Proposition 4 is larger than that of
Proposition 1. Proposition 1 orders 3, 1, 3, 5 and 3, 1, 3, 4), but Proposition 4 does
not. This is also visible from Figure 7. Profile I is judged better than J by Proposition 4 but not
by Proposition 1; Profile J is judged better than J by Proposition 1 but not by Proposition 4.
Figure 11 provides an alternative illustration of the differences in the measurement as-
sumptions behind each of Proposition 1 and Proposition 4 in the case of absolute variabil-
ity aversion. A movement from point I to point J (or to any other point in the area I JM) is
deemed to decrease poverty according to the usual multidimensional poverty indices covered
by Proposition 1, but not with respect to those of Proposition 4. A movement from point I
to point K is deemed to decrease poverty according to Proposition 4, but not with respect to
Proposition 1. This is also true of a movement from point I to any of the points in the area
IKNL with horizontal stripes. It is only to the points in the area ILM that a movement from
point I will be judged to decrease poverty according to both Proposition 1 and Proposition 4. It
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Figure 11: Effect of changes in temporal incomes
is worth noting that, as η increases, that area increases and so does the probability of obtaining
the same rankings from both propositions. In the limiting relative variability view, this area
extends to ILM.
Let m˜η,λ denote dominance over the class Π˜ηλ, so that A m˜η,λ˜ B means that distribution
A is preferred to distribution B according to Proposition 4. The next proposition considers how
the dominance relationships mη,λ˜ are nested.
Proposition 5.
If A m˜η,λ˜ B, then A m˜η,λ˜ B η

>  η, 1. (24)
If A å˜η,λ˜ B, then A å˜η,λ˜ B η

>  0, η. (25)
Proof. The proof is straightforward since, for any couple of profiles µ, τη and µ, τη from
Γiλ˜, i   1 or 2, the first one is preferred iff µ B µ and τη B τη . This implies that
xiµ

µη B
xiµ
µη B 0;
it can then be seen that x

iµ

µηµε B
xiµ
µηµε B
xiµ
µηµε ε A 0, since µ

B µ and the variability measure is
negative. Consequently, µ, τηε is preferred to µ, τηε.
The first part of Proposition 5 states that, using our mean/variability framework, a suffi-
cient condition for A to dominate B for some η is to observe such a dominance relationship
for a lower value of η. An immediate consequence is that dominance holds for all values of η
when dominance is observed for η   0. This makes it possible to obtain poverty comparisons
that are robust with respect to various views of variability aversion without having to perform
dominance tests for all such views.
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Figure 12: Poverty dominance criteria with intermediate aversion to availability (η   0.5)
and symmetry
The second part of Proposition 5 is a corollary of the first part: it is useless to check for
whether A dominates B for some η if dominance does not hold for a larger η. The inability to
order two distributions with a relative variability aversion view means that there is no hope of
obtaining dominance with intermediate or absolute views.
3.2 Symmetry
As in Section 2.1, symmetry can be assumed, so that poverty depends only on the gaps between
incomes as well as on mean income. As a consequence, an income profile x1, x2 is strictly
equivalent to an income profile x2, x1; both can be described by the same coordinates µ, τη.
We then have:
Π˜ηSλ˜

S   Pλ˜S > Π˜ηλ˜

S T ρ1µ, τη ; λ˜S   ρ2µ, τη ; λ˜S,µ, τη > Γλ˜S . (26)
Proposition 6.
PAλ˜S A PBλ˜S, Pλ˜S > Π˜ηSλ˜

S, (27)
iff P1,1A µ, τη A P
1,1
B µ, τη, µ, τη > Γλ˜

S. (28)
Proof. See appendix B.
Dominance of A over B for all measures within Π˜ requires that the joint distribution of
mean income and (the negative of) the distance of income to the mean for distribution A first-
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order dominates that for B, µ, τη > Γ˜λ˜. Figure 12 shows the two areas over which the
joint distributions are assessed for µ   u  v~2 and τ0.5   u  µ~µ0.5. As in the case of the
class of poverty indices studied in Section 2.1, symmetry implies that a larger share of the
population in one area can be compensated by a lower share in the other.
3.3 Asymmetry
As in Section 2.2, we can relax the symmetry assumption and suppose that income profile
x1, x2, with x1  x2, leads to greater poverty than x2, x1. With our mean/variability frame-
work, this says that the cost of variability depends on the timing of deprivations. Since profiles
within Γ1λ˜ are then worse than their symmetric image within Γ2λ˜, we can consider the fol-
lowing class of intertemporal poverty measures:
Π˜ηASλ˜

AS  
¢
¨
¨

¨
¨
¤
Pλ > Π˜ηλ˜

AS
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
ρ
2
1 µ, τη ; λ˜ B ρ
2
2 µ, τη ; λ˜
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη ; λ˜ C ρ
1,2
2 µ, τη ; λ˜.
£
¨
¨
§
¨
¨
¥
(29)
The first condition says that, for given µ, shrinking risk reduces povertymost when income
is lowest in the first period. The second condition says that the shrinking effect decreases more
rapidly with µ when incomes are lower in the first period.
Proposition 7.
PAλ˜AS A PBλ˜AS, Pλ˜AS > Π˜ηASλ˜

AS, (30)
iff qAP
1,1
A µ, τη Sx1  x2 A qBP
1,1
B µ, τη Sx1  x2, µ, τη > Γ1λ˜

AS (31)
and P1,1A µ, τη A P
1,1
B µ, τη, µ, τη > Γ2λ˜

AS. (32)
Proof. See appendix B.
Figure 13 illustrates the areas over which dominance tests are performed for asymmetric
mean/variability poverty measures and relative variability aversion. Such tests first entail
comparing the share of the population that belongs to each triangular area with a side along
the x2 axis and that fits within Γ1λ˜AS. If that share is nowhere lower for each a, b > Γ1λ˜AS,
then one turns to the second condition in Proposition 7 and compares the share of the popu-
lation within the union of two triangular areas, such as those defined by u, v and v, u, for
each u, v > Γ2λ˜AS. If this never results in a lower share for A than for B, then A shows
more poverty than B over the class of asymmetric mean/variability poverty indices and over
the set of poverty frontiers lying within the maximum poverty domain Γ λ˜AS. As in the case
of the asymmetric poverty indices of Proposition 3, the dominance criteria of Proposition 7
have a greater ranking power than those for the general class of mean/variability poverty
indices (Proposition 4). The power is weaker, however, than for the subclass of symmetric
mean/variability indices considered in Proposition 6.
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Figure 13: Poverty dominance criteria with relative variability aversion and asymmetry
4 On the relationships between the dominance criteria
Each of the classes Π˜λ˜ and Π¨λ (and their symmetric and asymmetric subclasses) of
povertymeasures presents appealing properties, but may not be individually regarded as fully
satisfying. Take for instance an income profile a, b, with b A a. If b increases, average income
also increases but variability τη rises for all η, so that the net poverty effect is ambiguous over
the class Π˜λ˜. Conversely, a transfer ι A 0 that leads to a  ι, b  ι, with 2ι  b  a, reduces
variability without affecting mean income, but cannot be regarded as favorable over the class
Π¨λ since it leads to a fall in one of the two incomes.
We may seek to address this difficulty by considering poverty indices Pλ that simultane-
ously belong to the above two classes. Define Π˘ηλ˜ as their intersection, that is:
Π˘ηλ˜

  
Pλ˜ > Π¨λ˜9 Π˜ηλ˜


 . (33)
As an illustration of membership into the class Π˘ηλ˜, we can consider some members
of the family of union bidimensional poverty indices PBC suggested by Bourguignon and
Chakravarty (2003). For a population of size n, PBC is defined as
PBC  
1
n
n
Q
i 1
a 1 x1i
β

 1 a 1 x2i
β

Ǒ
α
β , (34)
where xji denotes the income of the ith poor person at time j, y   max0, y, and where
poverty lines have been normalized to 1 at each period. For PBC to be a member of Π¨λ, it is
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necessary that β C 1 and α C β. It can be shown that for a   0.5,15 one then obtains a family of
measures P˘BC that is included in Π˘ηλ˜ since the measure can be expressed as:
P˘BC  
1
n
n
Q
i 1
0.5 1 µi  τ0i
β

 0.5 1 µi  τ0i
β

Ǒ
α
β . (35)
Now consider the additional restrictions that need to be imposed on members of Π¨λ˜ for
these also to be members of the subclass Π˘ηλ˜. Since the elements of Π˘ηλ˜ also belong to
Π˜ηλ˜

, the derivatives of pi with respect to µ and τη have to obey the restrictions imposed on
ρ. While condition piµx1, x2 B 0 is met with the restrictions imposed on pi1 and pi2 (see
appendix C), conditions piτηx1, x2 B 0 and piµ,τηx1, x2 B 0 respectively require (whenever
xi B xj) that
piix1, x2 pi
j
x1, x2 B 0, (36)
η piix1, x2pijx1, x2Ǒ µ  ητ0 pii,ix1, x2pii,jx1, x2Ǒ

µ  ητ0pi
i,j
x1, x2pi
j,j
x1, x2Ǒ C 0. (37)
Condition (36) says that the effect on the lower income of decreasing variability dominates
the effect on the larger one. In the case of symmetric poverty measures, condition (36) can also
be stated as pi1,1x1, x2   pi2,2x2, x1 C 0, which is a well-known convexity property for
poverty functions.16 Since all second-order derivatives are then positive, it can be shown that
members from Π˘ηSλ˜ comply with a multidimensional extension of the Pigou-Dalton trans-
fer, i.e. a progressive transfer at any period between to individuals that can unambiguously be
ranked in terms of poverty do not increase poverty.
Consider now the members of Π˜ηλ˜ that also belong to the subclass Π˘ηλ˜. For these
indices, ρ must be such that ρx1t µ, τη B 0, ρ
x2
t µ, τη B 0, and ρ
x1 ,x2
t µ, τη C 0 t   1, 2.
The first two conditions are automatically respected when ρt is derived with respect to the
lower value of the income profile; increasing that income simultaneously raises average in-
come and reduces variability, so that such an income increment would undoubtedly decrease
poverty. When the larger income increases, the conditions on the first-order derivatives of ρt
are satisfied if and only if t:
ρ
1
t µ, τη B µ
η

ητη
µ
 ρ
2
t µ, τη, (40)
which says that the mean effect dominates the risk effect, as would be the case for all members
15 Equal weights for each deprivation are necessary in order to obtain individual poverty indices that are de-
creasing with respect to τ0.
16 Assuming x1  x2, symmetry means that condition (36) can be expressed as:
pi1x1, x2 B pi
1
x2, x1. (38)
At the same time, we know that pi1,2x1 , x2 C 0, i.e. pi
1
x1 , x1  pi
1
x1 , x2 B 0. Combining this with (38)
yields:
pi1x1, x1 B pi
1
x2, x1. (39)
which implies that second-order derivatives of pi are non-negative x1 , x2.
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of Π¨λ. Regarding the cross-derivative condition, its sign is positive if and only if:
ρ
1,1
t µ, τη 2
ητη
µ
ρ
1,2
t µ, τη
ηη  1τη
2µ2
ρ
2
t µ, τη 



ητη
µ

2
 µ2η


ρ
2,2
t µ, τη C 0. (41)
which, in the case of absolute-variability aversion, states that the poverty-reducing effect of
mean increases should decrease more rapidly with mean income than the poverty reducing
effect of lowering variability with respect to variability.
Let A m¨λ B indicate dominance of A with respect to B over Π¨λ (cf. Proposition 1).
Proposition 8.
PAλ˜ A PBλ˜, Pλ˜ > Π˘ηλ˜

, (42)
if A m¨λ˜ B (43)
or A m˜η,λ˜ B. (44)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 8 highlights the complementary nature of the dominance relationships m¨λ and
m˜η,λ˜, shown through the “hybrid” class of intertemporal poverty indices Π˘ηλ˜

. If one fails to
observe a dominance relationship using Proposition 1, dominance my still be obtained using
Proposition 4, and vice-versa. Consider for instance a distribution A made of two poor income
profiles 3, 4 and 7, 1. Suppose that a distribution B is obtained by changing the second
income profile to 6, 2 using some variability reducing transfer. The two distributions A and
B cannot be compared using Proposition 1. However, whatever the value of η, the cumulative
distribution functions at µ, τη are never larger for B than for A, so that it can be concluded
that B has less poverty than A for all poverty indices in Π˘ηλ˜, some of them members of
Π¨λ.
Corollary 1. Assuming §x1, x2 > Γλ˜ such that P
1,1
A x1, x2 x P
1,1
B x1, x2, the following result
cannot be obtained:
A m¨λ˜ B and B m˜η,λ˜ A. (45)
Proof. See appendix C.
Corollary 1 says that if one observes that A is dominated by B over Π¨λ˜ (Π˜ηλ˜), one
would try in vain to infer that B is dominated by A over Π˜ηλ˜ (Π¨λ˜). Checking dominance
of the type m¨λ˜ (m˜η,λ˜) can thus provide information on dominance of type m˜η,λ˜ (m¨λ˜) since both
dominance criteria apply to classes of povertymeasures that include the set of “hybrid” indices
Π˘ηλ˜

.
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5 An illustration with European data
We illustrate the tools proposed in Sections 2 to 4 for intertemporal poverty comparisons using
intertemporal income data from 23 European countries.17 These data come from the 2009
version of the EU-SILC (European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions) database.
For each country, we select individuals that were surveyed both in 2006 and 2009. The 2006-
09 period is interesting since the European crisis may have resulted in a greater variability of
income, with an intensity that may, however, have been different across countries due in part
to differences in social safety net systems.
The dominance checks are performed using adult-equivalent disposable income obtained
with the OECD equivalence scale. Purchasing power differences are taken into account using
Eurostat PPP indices, and CPI indices were also used to compare income across periods.18 The
maximum poverty domain is defined using a “union” approach; individuals are thus regarded
as poor if they are suffering from monetary deprivation either in 2006 or 2009. The maximal
deprivation line was set to 120% of the overall median income, that is about 15,350e per person
and per year.19
Note that our primary objective is to assess the relative (and not the absolute) ranking power
of the results provided by Propositions 1 to 7. For this reason, we do not proceed to statistical
testing of the population orderings, preferring to focus on the sample orderings. This being
said, many of the sample orderings observed with our data may not be statistically inferable:
going beyond the illustrative purposes of this sectionwould require developing an appropriate
statistical inference setting.
5.1 Symmetric and asymmetric dominance within the Duclos et al.’s (2006) frame-
work
The results of the 253 pairwise comparisons performed using these samples and the domi-
nance criteria proposed in Section 2 are presented in Table 1. Remember that symmetry is a
limiting case of asymmetry, so that observing dominance with asymmetry entails that dom-
inance necessarily also holds with symmetry. As asymmetry is a special case of the general
case covered by Proposition 1, dominance with asymmetry is observed when Proposition 1’s
general dominance is observed.
Thus, for expositional simplicity, Table 1 reports the broadest classes of intertemporal in-
dices for which dominance is observed, if any. The first result is that about 46% of the pairwise
rankings can be made through Proposition 1. Since asymmetry can be applied in different
manners, the dominance checks use two rival versions of it, reflecting different attitudes with
17 The countries are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark
(DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithua-
nia (LT), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), and
United Kingdom (UK).
18 Incomes were censored at the bottom, so that our results should be regarded as restricted dominance tests (see
Davidson and Duclos, 2012, for theoretical and practical arguments). Censoring was applied at the second centile
of the pooled distribution of incomes in 2006 and 2009, that is, at around 2,100e per person and per year.
19 This figure is almost exactly equal to Italy’s median income of over the period. This choice is quite conservative
but would undoubtedly meet unanimous agreement as a value above which an individual cannot be considered
as deprived in the European context.
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Table 1: First-order dominance tests for intertemporal poverty indices (using income-defined indices)
Country BE BG CY CZ DK EE ES FI FR HU IS IT LT LV MT NL NO PL PT SE SI UK
AT g ¨m ¨lS g g ¨m ¨m g ¨mS ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m
BE . . . ¨m ¨l g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m g g g ¨m ¨m g g g
BG . . . . . . ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l
CY . . . . . . . . . ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m
CZ . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m g g g g g g ¨m g g g g g g g g g
DK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g g g g g g g ¨m ¨m g g g g ¨m g g g
EE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨l g ¨l ¨l ¨m g ¨l ¨l ¨l g g ¨l ¨l ¨l
ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l ¨l g ¨l ¨l ¨m ¨m g ¨l ¨l g g ¨l g ¨l
FI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m g g g ¨m ¨m g g g
FR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g g ¨m ¨m ¨m g g g ¨m ¨m g g g
HU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l g g g g ¨l ¨l g g g ¨l g
IS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨m ¨m ¨m g g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m
IT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨m ¨m g ¨l ¨l g ¨m ¨l g ¨l
LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l
LV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l ¨l ¨l g ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l
MT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l g ¨m ¨m g g g
NL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m ¨m g g g
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨m ¨m g g g
PL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨l ¨l
PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l ¨l ¨l
SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g g
SI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g
Note: ¨m ( ¨l) indicates that the first distribution dominates (is dominated by) the second distribution. Ø denotes a non-conclusive ordering. The “+”, “-”,
and “S” subscripts indicate that dominance holds only when the loss aversion asymmetry, early poverty asymmetry and symmetry assumptions are
used.
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respect to the patterns of income profiles. The first version considers that an income profile
a, b with a A b has more poverty than a symmetric profile b, a. Such a view can be sup-
ported by the concept of loss aversion. Loss aversion is prominent in prospect theory and
suggests that losses (of a given magnitude) can outweigh gains (of the same magnitude) in
terms of well-being, implying inter alia that individuals may prefer upward income profiles,
everything else being the same. The second version of asymmetry supports the opposite view,
that is, that an income profile a, b with a  b has more poverty than b, a. This view is con-
sistent with aversion to early poverty. Earlier income deprivations have longer-lasting effects
on people’s abilities to enjoy a valuable life. Consequently, the earlier a deprivation occurs, the
longer its effects may last. Both versions of asymmetry rely on reasonable and documented
grounds, so that it cannot easily be said which one is necessarily more appropriate.
Asymmetry increases the ordering power from 46% to 52% with loss aversion and from
46% to 49% with aversion to early poverty. The increase in the ordering power is higher with
loss aversion (an increase of 6/46=13% in the ordering power), indicating that it is more diffi-
cult to compare our European countries with a concern for early income poverty. With sym-
metry, the ordering power increases from 46% to 55% (an increase of 9/46=20% in the ordering
power). In most cases, the dominance relationships with symmetry corresponds to compar-
isons that are also robust either with loss aversion or with aversion to early poverty. Indeed,
symmetry is necessary to obtain a dominance relationship only in two cases, that is, when
comparing Austria with Cyprus and France.
Since symmetry and asymmetry are ways of extending the ordering power for intertempo-
ral poverty comparisons, we also contrast the results presented in Table 1 with those obtained
with second-order dominance. Increasing the order of dominance is a frequent procedure in
the stochastic dominance literature for attempting to obtain more distributional rankings. In a
multidimensional framework, second-order dominance means that poverty comparisons are
made with respect to members from a subclass of Π¨λ that are sensitive to inequalities be-
tween the poor (more details in Duclos et al., 2006). It is then supposed that a progressive
within-period transfer between two individuals reduces poverty. Moreover, the second-order
derivatives of the individual poverty index pi are decreasing and convex with respect to the
level of the other period’s income.
Note that second-order dominance thus requires cardinality of the different attributes used
to assess poverty, whereas ordinality is sufficient for first-order dominance checks. So, if in-
tertemporal poverty comparisons were performed for instance on health statuses at differ-
ent periods, second-order dominance checks could not plausibly be used, and symmetry and
asymmetry assumptions would be more natural avenues to extend the ordering power of first-
order dominance tests. The results of those second-order dominance tests are provided by
Table 2 and show that 62% of the comparisons are now conclusive. For several pairwise com-
parisons, first-order dominance tests with asymmetry or symmetry yield robust comparisons
that cannot be observed with second-order dominance, and vice versa. Such situations are ob-
served for 28 pairwise comparisons, that is about 11% of the possible pairwise comparisons,
22 out of these 28 additional orderings being observed only with the help of second-order
dominance procedures.
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Table 2: Second-order dominance tests for intertemporal poverty indices (using income-defined indices).
Country BE BG CY CZ DK EE ES FI FR HU IS IT LT LV MT NL NO PL PT SE SI UK
AT g ¨m ¨l g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m
BE . . . ¨m g g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨l ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m g g g
BG . . . . . . ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l
CY . . . . . . . . . ¨m g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m g ¨m ¨m
CZ . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m g g g ¨m ¨l g ¨m ¨m g ¨l g ¨m g g g g
DK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m g g g ¨l g ¨m ¨m g g g g ¨m ¨l g g
EE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨l g ¨l ¨l ¨m ¨m ¨l ¨l ¨l g g ¨l ¨l ¨l
ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l ¨l g ¨l ¨l ¨m ¨m ¨l ¨l ¨l g g ¨l ¨l ¨l
FI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m g ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m
FR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨m ¨m ¨m g g g ¨m ¨m g g g
HU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l g ¨m ¨m g ¨l ¨l g g g ¨l g
IS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨m ¨m ¨m ¨m g g ¨m ¨m g ¨m ¨m
IT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨m ¨m g ¨l ¨l ¨m ¨m ¨l g ¨l
LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l
LV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l ¨l
MT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l g ¨m ¨m g g g
NL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨m ¨m g g ¨m
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨m ¨m g g g
PL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g ¨l ¨l ¨l
PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¨l ¨l ¨l
SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g g
SI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g
Note: ¨m ( ¨l) indicates that the first distribution dominates (is dominated by) the second distribution. Ø denotes a non-conclusive ordering.
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Figure 14: Ordering power with different maximal deprivation lines.
Furthermore, even tough the results of Table 1 may look like those of Table 2, the two
approaches should be considered as complements, not as substitutes. This is because some
of the pairwise rankings can be made both with symmetric/asymmetric first-order and with
second-order dominance tests. This means that two countries can sometimes be ranked over
classes of poverty indices that are different than either the first-order or second-order usual
classes. When this is observed, this has the effect of strengthening the degree of agreement on
intertemporal poverty rankings across two populations.
The ordering power is likely to be contingent on the definition of themaximum poverty do-
main λS . To look into this, we estimate the share of pairwise comparisons yielding dominance
relationships for different maximum values of the deprivation frontiers, up to 45,000e. The
results are reported on Figure 14. Notice first that the absolute difference in ordering power
between the different first-order dominance procedures does not significantly change with the
value of the maximum deprivation line. In particular, asymmetry with loss aversion performs
systematically better than asymmetry with aversion to early poverty. This result is likely to be
due to the bad economic performance observed in some of our countries during the 2006-09
period; increasing unemployment and lower incomes yield joint distributions with a larger
population within the relatively low second-period income domain Γ2λS, that is, the set of
poverty profiles on which emphasis is put with loss aversion. Another interesting result is that
the gap between the second-order dominance procedure and the different first-order domi-
nance procedures is relatively constant, but widens significantly when the deprivation frontier
increases above 30,000e.
5.2 Mean/variability dominance
Our second set of dominance tests are made on the classes of mean/variability intertemporal
poverty indices presented in Section 3. A potential problem with these classes deals with the
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choice of a value for the parameter η. Proposition 5 shows, however, that a useful start can be
made by focussing on the absolute (η   0) and relative (η   1) bounds. The results (not shown
here) are somewhat surprising: we are unable to obtain any robust comparison using absolute
risk aversion, even when imposing symmetry. The relative rankings should in principle be
stronger, since the ordering power of relative risk aversion is theoretically greater (as shown
by Proposition 5). Our results shows, however, that the ordering power increases little with
relative risk aversion since only one dominance relationship is obtained, between Cyprus and
Spain. This limited ranking power is in large part due to the presence in each distribution of
highly volatile income profiles, which make it difficult to establish dominance over large areas
of mean/variability thresholds.
The role of income variability in explaining these results can be seen by comparing these
results with those presented in Table 3. Table 3 keeps the same value for the deprivation line
but consider a subset of the class of intertemporal poverty indices Π˜λ˜S for which individual
poverty is not affected by income variability; said differently, perfect individual-level income
pooling is assumed, so that mean temporal income is all that matters for assessing well-being.
The dominance criterion compares the distribution functions of mean temporal income, thus
proceeding to a unidimensional analysis.20 Table 3 confirms that income variability accounts
for the low ranking power of the mean/variability dominance tests: the ordering power in-
creases to 63% when no risk aversion is assumed. Note that the ordering power is necessarily
larger than the one observed with symmetry using the joint distribution of income (55%), but
that gain can be regarded as somewhat low considering the robustness loss caused by the as-
sumption of perfect individual-level income pooling. Said differently, about 12% (8/65) of the
pairs of countries that can be ranked on the basis of the distributions of mean income cannot
be ranked anymore if a potential welfare loss can be attributed to the temporal variability of
income around its mean.
The effect of income volatility can also be inferred from Figures 15a and 15b. As for Fig-
ure 14, the curves show the proportions of dominance relationships observed for different
maximum deprivation thresholds (up to 20,000e). The rapid collapse of the ordering power
below 5,000e, in particular when income variability is assessed in absolute terms, confirms
that income volatility limits the power of mean/variability dominance relationships. This be-
ing said, comparing Figures 15a and 15b shows nicely the gain in ordering power that can be
attained by imposing relative as opposed to absolute variability aversion.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes and applies procedures for making intertemporal poverty rankings. More
generally, it considers comparisons of populations when multidimensional attributes of inter-
est can be measured along comparable scales. The orderings are obtained with assumptions
that do not require cardinality of the attributes, as would be required for instance with Pigou-
20 More specifically, we consider poverty indices from Π˜Sλ˜S such that ρ
2
t µ, τη   ρ
1,2
t µ, τη   0 t   1, 2.
It can then be easily be seen from equation (81) in appendix B that the poverty domain is necessarily defined as
the set of income profiles such that µ  z. Moreover, the corresponding dominance relationship compares the
cumulative distribution of mean income up to z of the two populations.
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Table 3: First-order dominance tests with perfect intertemporal income pooling.
Country BE BG CY CZ DK EE ES FI FR HU IS IT LT LV MT NL NO PL PT SE SI UK
AT g mµ lµ g g mµ mµ g mµ mµ g mµ mµ mµ mµ g g mµ mµ g g mµ
BE . . . mµ lµ mµ g mµ mµ g g mµ lµ mµ mµ mµ mµ lµ g mµ mµ g mµ g
BG . . . . . . lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ
CY . . . . . . . . . mµ g mµ mµ mµ mµ mµ g mµ mµ mµ mµ g g mµ mµ mµ mµ mµ
CZ . . . . . . . . . . . . g g g lµ g mµ lµ g mµ mµ g lµ g mµ g g g g
DK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g g g g g lµ g mµ mµ g g g g mµ g g g
EE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g lµ lµ g lµ lµ mµ mµ lµ lµ lµ g g lµ lµ lµ
ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lµ lµ g lµ lµ mµ mµ g lµ lµ g mµ lµ g lµ
FI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g mµ lµ mµ mµ mµ g g g mµ mµ g g g
FR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g lµ mµ mµ mµ g lµ g mµ mµ g g g
HU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lµ g g g g lµ lµ g g g lµ g
IS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mµ mµ mµ mµ g g mµ mµ mµ mµ mµ
IT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mµ mµ g lµ lµ g mµ lµ g lµ
LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ lµ
LV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lµ lµ lµ g lµ lµ lµ lµ
MT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lµ g mµ mµ g g g
NL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g mµ mµ g mµ mµ
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mµ mµ g g g
PL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g lµ lµ lµ
PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lµ lµ lµ
SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g g
SI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g
Note: mµ (lµ) indicates that the first distribution dominates (is dominated by) the second distribution. Ø denotes a non-conclusive test.
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(a) Absolute view (η   0).
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(b) Relative view (η   1).
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Note: Each point gives the proportion of cross-country dominance relationships observed with the
EU-SILC data for a maximal union poverty domain with bounds given by the x-axis.
Figure 15: Ordering power with different maximal deprivation lines for mean/variability
indices.
Dalton-like transfer axioms. The role of symmetric and asymmetric assumptions is investi-
gated. Symmetry supposes that the social evaluator is sensitive to the overall distribution of
temporal deprivations, but not about the sequence of these deprivations, so that switching
two incomes within an individual income profile is supposed not to affect overall well-being.
The less demanding asymmetry assumptions suppose that the social evaluator prefers that
incomes either decrease (loss aversion) or increase (early poverty aversion) over time. An
empirical illustration on 23 European countries for the 2006-2009 period shows that such pro-
cedures can significantly improve the ranking power of dominance tests. The fact that the
results without variability-sensitivity are only slightly better further suggest that considerable
ranking robustness can be obtained without having to suppose perfect intertemporal income
pooling.
The paper also introduces classes of poverty indices that depend onmean temporal income
and income variability. This framework is more demanding in terms of indicator comparability
than the previous one as it requires full cardinality of the indicators used to measure poverty
(since it uses distances from mean income as a measure of income variability). The framework
nevertheless makes it possible to incorporate a natural intertemporal “progressive transfer”
assumption (without having to impose interpersonal progressive transfer assumptions, in the
like of the popular Pigou-Dalton transfer principle). Moreover, it mirrors economists’ common
mean-and-variance framework often used to describe distributions and assess risk behavior.
This framework can also incorporate symmetry and asymmetry axioms and can be applied
to a continuum of different views of risk aversion, with the well-known relative and absolute
views as limiting cases.
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This common mean/variability framework for thinking about intertemporal welfare does
not, however, have empirical strength when applied to our data. Dominance tests on a subset
of indices that do no not display variability-sensitivity show that this low ordering power is
mostly due to the income variability observed in our distributions. This result suggests that the
popular mean/variance approachmay not be as useful for intertemporal poverty comparisons
as some of the recent income-based framework developed within welfare economics.
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A Proof of propositions from Section 2
Let z1x2 and z2x1 be respectively the value of the first and second-period income, such that λx1, z2x1  
0 and λz1x2, x2   0. Thus, z1z2x1   x1, and z1 is then the inverse of z2. Let z be the value of
income such that λz, z   0. We than can define a two-period poverty index as a sum of low x1 (with
respect to x2) and of low x2 (with respect to x1) time poverty:
Pλ  
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pix1, x2,λ f x1, x2dx1dx2 
S
z
0
S
z2x1
x1
pix1, x2;λ f x1, x2dx2dx1. (46)
We first proceed with the first part of the right-hand term of (46). Integrating that expression by
parts with respect to x1, we find:
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pix1, x2,λ f x1, x2dx1dx2  
S
z
0
pix1, x2Fx1Sx2
x1 z1x2
x1 x2
f x2 dx2

S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1x1, x2Fx1Sx2 f x2 dx1dx2. (47)
Rearranging the first element of (47), we find
S
z
0
 pix1, x2Fx1Sx2
x1 z1x2
x1 x2
f x2 dx2
 
S
z
0
piz1x2, x2Fz1x2Sx2pix2, x2Fx1   x2Sx2Ǒ f x2 dx2 (48)
  
S
z
0
pix2, x2Fx1   x2Sx2 f x2 dx2, (49)
since piz1x2, x2   0.
To integrate the second part of the right-hand term of (47) by parts with respect to x2, let Kx2  
R
z1x2
x2
pi1x1, x2 Fx1, x2 dx1. We then get:
∂Kx2
∂x2
  z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2
pi1x2, x2Fx2, x2

S
z1x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1

S
z1x2
x2
pi1x1, x2Fx1Sx2 f x2 dx1. (50)
Integrating that expression along x2 and over  0, z and rearranging, we have:
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1x1, x2Fx1Sx2 f x2 dx1dx2 (51)
 
Kx2
z
0 S
z
0
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2 dx2

S
z
0
pi1x2, x2Fx2, x2 dx2 
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1dx2, (52)
  
S
z
0
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2 dx2

S
z
0
pi1x2, x2Fx2, x2 dx2 
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1dx2, (53)
35
since z1z   z (hence Kz   0) and Fx1, 0   0 x1 (hence K0   0). Using (49) and (53), we obtain:
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pix1, x2,λ f x1, x2dx1dx2
  
S
z
0
pix2, x2Fx1   x2Sx2 f x2 dx2 
S
z
0
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2 dx2

S
z
0
pi1x2, x2Fx2, x2 dx2 
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1dx2. (54)
Proceeding similarly with the second part of the right-hand term of (46) and adding the above, we
obtain:
Pλ   
S
z
0
pix2, x2Fx1   x2Sx2 f x2 dx2 
S
z
0
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2 dx2

S
z
0
pi1x2, x2Fx2, x2 dx2 
S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1dx2

S
z
0
pix1, x1Fx2   x1Sx1 f x1 dx1 
S
z
0
z2x1pi
2
x1, z2x1Fx1, z2x1 dx1

S
z
0
pi2x1, x1Fx1, x1 dx1 
S
z
0
S
z2x1
x1
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx2dx1. (55)
It can be observed that Fx2   x1Sx1 f x1  
∂Fx1,x1
∂x1
 Fx1Sx2   x1 f x2   x1, so that:
S
z
0
pix1, x1Fx2   x1Sx1 f x1 dx1
 
S
z
0
pix1, x1
∂Fx1 , x1
∂x1
dx1 
S
z
0
pix1, x1Fx1Sx2   x1 f x2   x1 dx1 (56)
   pix1, x1Fx1, x1
z
0 S
z
0
pi1x1, x1pi
2
x1, x1Ǒ Fx1, x1 dx1

S
z
0
pix1, x1Fx1Sx2   x1 f x2   x1 dx1 (57)
  
S
z
0
pi1x1, x1pi
2
x1, x1Ǒ Fx1, x1 dx1

S
z
0
pix2, x2Fx1   x2Sx2 f x2 dx2. (58)
Using that result and changing the integration variable in
R
z
0 pi
2
x2, x2Fx2, x2 dx2, we then
have:
Pλ  
S
z
0
z2x1pi
2
x1, z2x1Fx1, z2x1 dx1

S
z
0
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2 dx2

S
z
0
S
z2x1
x1
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx2dx1

S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1dx2. (59)
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Symmetry implies the following properties:
pi1x1, x2   pi
2
x2, x1 x1, x2, (60)
pi1,2x1, x2   pi
1,2
x2, x1 x1, x2. (61)
At the poverty frontier, we also have λx1, x2   0 and pix2z1x2, x2   0. Since:
pix2z1x2, x2   z

1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2pi
2
z1x2, x2, (62)
we obtain:
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2   pi
2
z1x2, x2. (63)
Symmetry also leads to z1x2   z2x2 and z1x2   z

2x2. Using (60), we find that:
z1x2pi
1
z1x2, x2   z

2x2pi
2
x2, z2x2. (64)
From the expression of Pλ in (59), the symmetry assumptions therefore lead to:
Pλ  
S
z
0
z
1
1 x2pi
1
z1x2, x2Fz1x2, x2 Fx2, z2x2Ǒ dx2 (65)

S
z
0
S
z1x2
x2
pix1 ,x2x1, x2Fx1, x2 Fx2, x1 dx1dx2 (66)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for Proposition 2 follow upon inspection.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
With asymmetry, we assume that z2x1 C z1x1 for all x1 >  0, z. Equation (46) can then be rewritten
as:
Pλ  
S
z
0
S
z2x1
x1
pix1, x2;λ f x1, x2 dx2dx1

S
z
0
S
z2x2
x2
pix1, x2,λ f x1, x2 dx1dx2. (67)
Equation (59) then becomes:
Pλ  
S
z
0
z2x1pi
2
x1, z2x1Fx1, z2x1 dx1

S
z
0
z2x2pi
1
z2x2, x2Fz2x2, x2 dx2

S
z
0
S
z2x1
x1
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx2dx1

S
z
0
S
z2x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2Fx1, x2 dx1dx2. (68)
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We obtain:
Pλ  
S
z
0
z2x1pi
2
z2x1, x1 Fz2x1, x1 Fx1, z2x1 dx1

S
z
0
z2x1 pi
1
x1, z2x1pi
2
z2x1, x1 Fx1, z2x1 dx1

S
z
0
S
z2x2
x2
pi1,2x1, x2  Fx1, x2 Fx2, x1 dx1dx2

S
z
0
S
z2x1
x1
pi1,2x1, x2pi
1,2
x2, x1 Fx1, x2dx2dx1, (69)
with, by assumption, pi1x1, z2x1 pi2z2x1, x1 B 0 and pi1,2x1, x2  pi1,2x2, x1 C 0. The
second and fourth terms of the right-hand side of (69) account for the first condition of Proposition 3,
while the first and third terms account for its second condition.
B Proof of propositions from Section 3
Let the lowest value of mean income on the mean/variability poverty frontier be obtained for τη   0
at µ   z, so that λ˜z, 0   λz, z   0. At this point, it is also necessary to differentiate between the
cases of x1  x2 and x1 A x2. Let τz1η µ (τ
z2
η µ) be the value of τη such that λ˜µ, τ
z
ηµ   0 when x1  x2
( x1 A x2). Since individuals are supposed to be poor τη if µ B z, τz1η µ and τ
z2
η µ are defined on the
intervals  z,ª. Due to the monotonicity assumptions,
∂τz1η
∂µ B 0 and
∂τz2η
∂µ B 0.
Let q   probx1  x2 and ρ1 (ρ2) be the individual poverty measure to be applied when x1  x2
(x1 A x2). Let f1 ( f2) denote the joint density function of µ and τη, conditional on x1  x2 (x1 A x2).
The same notation applies for the cdf, conditional cdf and marginal cdf and marginal density functions.
With the above, lifetime poverty defined in (19) can alternatively be defined as:
P˜λ˜   q
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ1µ, τη , λ˜ f1µ, τη dτηdµ q
S
ª
z
S
τz1η µ
µ1η
ρ1µ, τη , λ˜ f1µ, τη dτηdµ (70)
 1 q
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ2µ, τη , λ˜ f2µ, τη dτηdµ  1 q
S
ª
z
S
τz2η µ
µ1η
ρ2µ, τη , λ˜ f2µ, τη dτηdµ.
For convenience, λ˜ is dropped from the expression of ρ. We first consider the first and third elements
of the right-hand term of (70) and, integrating by parts, find j   1, 2:
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρjµ, τη f jµ, τηdτηdµ  
S
z
0
ρjµ, τηFjτη Sµ
τη 0
τη µ1η
f jµ dµ

S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
2
j µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτηdµ. (71)
As Fjτη   µ1η Sµ   0 and Fjτη   0Sµ   1, the first element on the right-hand side of (71) can be
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expressed as:
S
z
0
ρjµ, τηFjτη Sµ
τη 0
τη µ1η
f jµ dµ
 
S
z
0
ρjµ, 0 f jµ dµ,
 
ρjµ, 0Fjµ
µ z
µ 0

S
z
0
ρ
1
j µ, 0Fjµ dµ
  
S
z
0
ρ
1
j µ, 0Fjµ dµ, (72)
since Fjµ   0   0 and the function ρj is zero at the poverty frontier (ρjz, 0   0).
We now can turn to the second element of the right-hand termof (71). Define Qjµ  
R
0
µ1η ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjµ, τη dτη.
We have:
∂Qj
∂µ
  1 ηµηρ2j µ,µ
1η
 Fj µ,µ
1η


S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j µ, τηFjµ, τη dτη

S
0
µ1η
ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτη
 
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j µ, τηFjµ, τη dτη S
0
µ1η
ρ
2
j µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτη , (73)
since Fjµ,µ1η   0. Integrating that expression along µ and over  0, z and rearranging, we have:
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτηdµ   Qjµ
z
0

S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j
µ, τηFjµ, τη dτηdµ
 
S
0
z1η
ρ
2
j z
, τηFjz
, τη dτη

S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j µ, τηFjµ, τη dτηdµ. (74)
We then consider the second and fourth elements on the right-hand side of (70) and, using once
again integration by parts, find:
S
ª
z
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρjµ, τη f jµ, τη dτηdµ  
S
ª
z
ρjµ, τηFjτη Sµ
τη τ
zj
η µ
τη µ1η
f jµ dµ

S
ª
z
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
2
j µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτηdµ
  
S
ª
z
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτηdµ, (75)
as ρjµ, τ
zj
η µ   0 and Fjτη   µ1η Sµ   0.
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Let Rjµ  
R
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjµ, τη dτη. We have:
∂Rj
∂µ
  τ
zj
η

µρ
2
j
µ, τzjη µFjµ, τ
zj
η µ 1 ηµ
ηρ
2
j µ,µ
1η
Fjµ,µ
1η


S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j µ, τηFjµ, τη dτη S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
2
j µ, τηFjτηSµ f jµ dτη ,
  τ
zj
η

µρ
2
j
µ, τzjη µFjµ, τ
zj
η µ

S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j
µ, τηFjµ, τη dτη 
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjτηSµ f jµ dτη. (76)
Integrating that expression along µ and over  z,ª and rearranging, we have:
S
ª
z
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
2
j
µ, τηFjτη Sµ f jµ dτηdµ
 
Rjµ
ª
z

S
ª
z
τ
zj
η

µρ
2
j
µ, τzjη µFjµ, τ
zj
η µ dµ

S
ª
z
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j
µ, τηFjµ, τη dτηdµ
 
S
τ
zj
η ª
ª
1η
ρ
2
j
ª, τηFjª, τη dτη 
S
0
z1η
ρ
2
j
z, τηFjz
, τη dτη

S
ª
z
τ
zj
η

µρ
2
j
µ, τzjη µFjµ, τ
zj
η µ dµS
ª
z
S
τ
zj
η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
j
µ, τηFjµ, τη dτηdµ. (77)
Using (72), (74), (77), and ρ1µ, 0   ρ2µ, 0 µ , we finally obtain the following expression for Pλ:
P˜λ˜   
S
z
0
ρ
1
2 µ, 0Fµ dµ  qS
τz1η ª
ª
1η
ρ
2
1 ª, τηF1ª, τη dτη (78)
 q
S
ª
z
τz1η

µρ
2
1 µ, τ
z1
η µF1µ, τ
z1
η µ dµ  qS
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τηF1µ, τη dτηdµ
 q
S
ª
z
S
τz1η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τηF1µ, τη dτηdµ  1 qS
τz2η ª
ª
1η
ρ
2
2 ª, τηF2ª, τη dτη
 1 q
S
ª
z
τz2η

µρ
2
2 µ, τ
z2
η µF2µ, τ
z2
η µ dµ
 1 q
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
2 µ, τηF2µ, τη dτηdµ  1 qS
ª
z
S
τz2η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
2 µ, τηF2µ, τη dτηdµ.
Proposition 4 then follows directly from (78) by inspection.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Letting ρ1µ, τη   ρ2µ, τη µ, τη > ΓSλ˜, it follows that µ, τη > ΓSλ˜:
ρ
2
1 µ, τη   ρ
2
2 µ, τη, (79)
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη   ρ
1,2
2 µ, τη. (80)
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Moreover, τz1η µ   τ
z2
η µ, so that τ
z1
η

µ   τz2η

µ. Equation (78) can then be rewritten as:
P˜λ˜   
S
z
0
ρ
1
1 µ, 0Fµ dµS
τz1η ª
ª
1η
ρ
2
1 ª, τηFª, τη dτη

S
ª
z
τz1η

µρ
2
1 µ, τ
z1
η µFµ, τ
z1
η µ dµ

S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τηFµ, τη dτηdµS
ª
z
S
τzηµ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τηFµ, τη dτηdµ. (81)
The rest of the proof follows by inspection.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 7
With asymmetry, it is assumed that τz1η µ C τ
z2
η µ for all µ >  z
,ª. As a consequence, equation (46)
can be rewritten as:
P˜λ˜   q
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ1µ, τη , λ˜ f1µ, τη dτηdµ q
S
ª
z
S
τz1η µ
µ1η
ρ1µ, τη , λ˜ f1µ, τη dτηdµ (82)
 1 q
S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ2µ, τη , λ˜ f2µ, τη dτηdµ  1 q
S
ª
z
S
τz1η µ
µ1η
ρ2µ, τη , λ˜ f2µ, τη dτηdµ.
Noting that ρ21 µ, τη ρ
2
2 µ, τη B 0 and ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη ρ
1,2
2 µ, τη C 0, we obtain:
P˜λ˜   
S
z
0
ρ
1
2 µ, 0Fµ dµS
τz1η ª
ª
1η
ρ
2
2 ª, τηFª, τη dτη (83)
 q
S
τz1η ª
ª
1η
ρ
2
1 ª, τη ρ
2
2 ª, τηǑ F1ª, τη dτη

S
ª
z
τz1η

µρ
2
2 µ, τ
z1
η µFµ, τ
z1
η µ dµ
 q
S
ª
z
τz1η

µ ρ
2
1 µ, τ
z1
η µ ρ
2
2 µ, τ
z1
η µǑ F1µ, τ
z1
η µ dµ

S
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
2 µ, τηFµ, τη dτηdµS
z
0
S
0
µ1η
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη ρ
1,2
2 µ, τηǑ F1µ, τη dτηdµ

S
ª
z
S
τz1η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
2 µ, τηFµ, τη dτηdµ
 q
S
ª
z
S
τz1η µ
µ1η
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη ρ
1,2
2 µ, τηǑ F1µ, τη dτηdµ.
The rest of the proof follows by inspection.
C Intersection of the different classes of poverty measures
C.1 The derivations of additional restrictions on the individual poverty measure
pi and ρ
We first consider the conditions that ρ must obey so that members of Π¨λ are also members of Π˜λ˜.
First, we have pixix1, x2 B 0,i   1, 2, so that we should also observe ρ
xi
t µ, τη B 0 t. When xi is not
the lowest income, an income increment increases variability (Sτη S rises) while increasing mean income,
so that the net effect of this is a priori not known. Assuming x1 to be the lowest income, if that net effect
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is supposed to correspond to a decrease in the level of poverty, we should have:
ρ
x2
1 µ, τη   ρ
1
1 µ, τηµ
x2
 ρ
2
1 µ, τητ
x2
η B 0 (84)

1
2
ρ
1
1 µ, τη
1
2
µη1 
η
2
x2  x1 µ ρ
2
1 µ, τη B 0 (85)

1
2
ρ
1
1 µ, τη
1
2
µη 
ητη
µ
 ρ
2
1 µ, τη B 0 (86)
 ρ
1
1 µ, τη B µ
η

ητη
µ
 ρ
2
1 µ, τη. (87)
In the same manner, it would also be necessary to observe ρx1,x2µ, τη C 0. Still supposing x1 to
be the lower income, we have:
ρ
x1,x2
1 µ, τη  
1
4
ρ
1,1
1 µ, τη
1
4
µη1 
η
2
x2  x1 µ ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη

ηη  1
2
2η1x1  x2
η2
x2  x1ρ
2
1 µ, τη

1
2
µη1 
η
2
x2  x1 µ
1
2
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη
1
2
µη1 
η
2
x2  x1 µ ρ
2,2
1 µ, τη (88)
 
1
4
ρ
1,1
1 µ, τη
η
4
µη1x2  x1ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη

ηη  1
2
2η1x1  x2
η2
x2  x1ρ
2
1 µ, τη

1
4
µ2η1 
η2
4
x2  x1
2
 µ2 ρ
2,2
1 µ, τη (89)
 
1
4
ρ
1,1
1 µ, τη
1
2
ητη
µ
ρ
1,2
1 µ, τη
ηη  1τη
8µ2
ρ
2
1 µ, τη

1
4



ητη
µ

2
 µ2η


ρ
2,2
1 µ, τη. (90)
Considering the case of absolute variability aversion (η   0), ρt must exhibit the following two
properties:
¢
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¤
ρ
1
t µ, τ0 B ρ
2
t µ, τ0,
ρ
1,1
t µ, τ0 C ρ
2,2
t µ, τ0.
(91)
With relative variability aversion (η   1), the conditions become:
¢
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¤
ρ
1
t µ, τ1 B
1τ1
µ ρ
2
t µ, τ1,
ρ
1,1
t µ, τ1 C
2τ1
µ ρ
1,2
t µ, τ1
τ1
µ2
ρ
2
t µ, τ1
1τ21
µ2
ρ
2,2
t µ, τ1.
(92)
It can also be shown that x1   µ  τηµη and x2   µ  τηµη if x1  x2. It is then possible to compute
piµ, piτη and piµ,τη to see what conditions have to be met so that pi respects the conditions imposed
on ρ. First, considering the derivatives of pi with respect to mean income, we should observe:
piµx1, x2   pi
1
x1, x2x
µ
1 pi
2
x1, x2x
µ
2 B 0 (93)
 1 ητηµη1pi1x1, x2 1 ητηµ
η1
pi2x1, x2 B 0. (94)
That condition is always fulfilled since 1  ητηµη1 and 1  ητηµη1 are positive for η >  0, 1, and
pi1x1, x2 and pi2x1, x2 are also non-negative. The result is intuitive. Increasing the mean without
altering variability implies increasing income at both periods, so that poverty should logically fall.
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Considering now a decrease in variability without a change in mean income, things are less clear
since such a change raises the lower income but decreases the higher one. It is then necessary to consider
the net sum of those opposite effects. Since ρ2t µ, τη B 0, we should obtain:
piτηx1, x2   µ
ηpi1x1, x2 µ
ηpi2x1, x2 B 0 (95)
 pi1x1, x2 B pi
2
x1, x2. (96)
Finally, pi has to be defined so as to respect piµ,τηx1, x2 C 0. We have:
piµ,τηx1, x2   ηµ
η1pi1x1, x2 1 ητηµ
η1

µηpi1,1x1, x2 µ
ηpi1,2x1, x2Ǒ
 ηµη1pi2x1, x2 1 ητηµ
η1

µηpi1,2x1, x2 µ
ηpi2,2x1, x2Ǒ (97)
  ηµη1 pi1x1, x2pi
2
x1, x2Ǒ µ
η
1 ητηµη1 pi1,1x1, x2pi
1,2
x1, x2Ǒ
 µη1 ητηµη1 pi1,2x1, x2pi
2,2
x1, x2Ǒ . (98)
With absolute variability aversion (η   0), pi should be such that:
¢
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¤
pi1x1, x2 B pi2x1, x2,
pi1,1x1, x2 C pi2,2x1, x2.
(99)
With relative variability aversion (η   1), we obtain, for x1  x2:
¢
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¤
pi1x1, x2 B pi2x1, x2,
pi1x1, x2pi2x1, x2 µ1 τ1 pi1,1x1, x2pi1,2x1, x2
µ1 τ1 pi1,2x1, x2pi2,2x1, x2 C 0.
(100)
C.2 Proof of Proposition 8 and Corollary 1
We have shown that it is possible to impose restrictions on the derivatives of both pix1, x2 and ρµ, τη
to obtain measures that are included in both Π˜λ˜ and Π¨λ. Since the class of poverty measures
Π˘ηλ˜

 is not empty, any measure Pλ˜ > Π˘ηλ˜ can equally be expressed using equation (8) or equa-
tion (19). Consequently, both (59) and (78) are valid expressions for Pλ˜. For Proposition 8 not to
hold, it would be necessary to show that one can find two distributions A and B such that A m¨λ˜ B and
Bm˜η,λ˜ A. However, with the restrictions imposed on the classes Π¨λ

 and Π˜λ˜, such a situation
would imply that for any poverty measure in Π˘ηλ˜, the difference PAλ˜  PBλ˜ should simulta-
neously be non-negative and non-positive. This will happen if and only if P1,1A x1, x2   P
1,1
B x1, x2,
x1, x2 > Γλ˜. This proves Proposition 8.
The demonstration of Corollary 1 is straightforward. As long as the class of poverty measures
Π˘ηλ˜

 is not empty, observing dominance with respect to either Π¨λ or Π˜λ˜ precludes observing
an opposite strong dominance relationship with the other class of poverty measures, as both classes
include Π˘ηλ˜.
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